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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Twenty Years of Colorado Supreme Court Decisions
Without Law
By MELVIN ARNOLD COFFEE
Melvin Coffee: Born Chicago, Illinoisi attended University of Colorado;
member of Pi Gamma Mu, national social science honorary; student
member of Colorado Bar Association; now completing junior year at
University of Denver College of Law; student business manager of Dicta.
This article is an editorial on the fact of the trend in the Colo-
rado supreme court to affirm district and county court rulings
without written opinions, without stating reasons and without citing
authority to sustain affirmance. It is written with a firm conviction
that the supreme court, to a very great extent, is responsible for
the freedoms of Colorado citizens. In the charts that follow, the
figures representing decisions from 1936 to 1948 are based upon
three articles in the Rocky Mountain Law Review.1 The figures
representing decisions from January Term 1949, through December
Term 1955, are based upon a case by case analysis by this writer.
There is much confusion created when a lower court ruling is
affirmed without written opinion. Practitioners cannot know the
effect of such a decision upon the validity or applicability of pre-
existing law as stated by the judge who tried the case. Does such
a judgment uphold the trial court's opinion thereby strengthening
it, or is the high court merely dodging issues because of facts pe-
culiar to the particular case? Or does the supreme court feel that
the law is so clear and so manifestly applicable to the facts that
they will not glorify nonsensical contentions by explaining to the
plaintiff in error why the lower court ruling must be affirmed?
Rule 118(f) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that, "Any judgment may be affirmed without written opinion....
Evidently the Colorado supreme court has a tendency to interpret
"may" as "shall" for it is a fact that from 1936 through 1955 more
and more attorneys, percentagewise, received a single blue-backed
typewritten sheet from the clerk's office stating that the issues
raised by the plaintiff in error had been decided with a perfunctory
"AFFIRMED WITHOUT WRITTEN OPINION." Neither the client
nor the progress of the law gains from the great amount of money
necessarily expended in the prosecution of a review decided in such
a manner.
Of perhaps more importance than the client's money is the
effect of such a decision on the attorney-client relation. One should
1 Blickhahn, The Trend-Survey of the Work of the Colorado Supreme Court in 1947 and 1948,
21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 202, 204 (1948); Bowen and De Souchet, The Trend-Survey of the Work of
the Colorado Supreme Court, 1942-1946, 19 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 274, 276 (1947); Holme, Jr., Wil-
liams, and Driscoll, Jr., The Trend-Survey of the Work of the Colorado Supreme Court, 14 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 213, 214, 215 (1942).
2 These figures include decisions in cases of original proceeding such as disbarment proceed-
ings, interrogatories of the senate, "interrogatories of the governor and declaratory judgments of
peculiar nature, thereby decreasing the true percentage of affirmances without written opinion.
3 Colo. Rules Civ. Proc. 118 (f).
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think that counsel's advice to appeal would usually be well-founded,
i.e., that at least one point of law decided unfavorably below is at
least questionable to the prejudice of the prospective plaintiff in
error. The figures show, however, that as of recent times approxi-
mately twenty-five per cent of all such advice must have been com-
pletely ill-founded. This surely does nothing to strengthen an
attorney-client relation.
Of greatest lasting importance, however, is the impact of this
trend upon democratic theory as traditionally practiced in America.
Without a prolonged dissertation on the essence and mechanics of
a democracy, it may be assumed that one of its tenets is that which
demands a government of laws and not a government of men. This
political principle means that men and their cases are to be judged
by fixed standards only. Further, it means that everyone knows,
or at least can know, that if he acts in a certain manner, certain
results will follow. An affirmance without opinion fails to provide
knowledge or notice of the law which governs. It does not make
the law clear, certain or definite. Instead law students, practitioners
and jurists find themselves in a state of uncertainty illustrated in
a recent dispute:
It is the contention of the Plaintiff in Error that the informa-
tion did not charge rape. It is true that a similar fact situation
was presented in Sanchez et al v. People, No. 17809, 293 P. 2d,
297, decided February 14, 1956 and it is true that the question
was squarely presented by the briefs in that case.
It was indeed unfortunate that the case was dispensed with the
omnipotent words "AFFIRMED WITHOUT WRITTEN OPIN-
ION". These words neither add to nor subtract from the exist-
ing law on the subject. These words mean only that for some
reason this court decided that the conviction should be af-
firmed without an opinion.
That decision is not law on any point.
We are sure that the Attorney General does not mean that that
case affirmed, reversed, distinguished, accepted or rejected the
existing Colorado law on the subject...
We cannot read minds; we do not know why the conviction
was affirmed without written opinion ...
Presumably we are arguing here legal points and we are en-
titled to a legal decision, not only to guide this case, but all
similar cases in the future. The Attorney General argues that
the Supreme Court has ruled adversely in the Sanchez case,
supra, but what lawyer could find such law in the Sanchez
case?4 We are surprised that the Attorney General would cite
such a case in view of the fact that there was no opinion to
guide anyone in the law. What lawyer could find the law in the
Sanchez case?
4 Reply Brief of Plaintiff in Error in Cedilla v. People, Colo. Sup. Ct. No. 17905, pp. 5.7. Both
the Cedilla and the Sanchez case involved the question whether the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of rape if oa information fails to negate a marital relation between the prosueutrix
and the defendaht. Both were affirmed without written opinion.
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That which deals with the law should be qualitative rather
than quantitative. It is perhaps ironic that this article, with the
graph and table that follows, emphasizes the quantitative with the
sole aim of improving the qualitative.'
Affirmances Without Opinion from Jan. Term 1949
through Jan. Term 1956
Percent-
Total age of
No No Affirm- Decisions
Written Written ances Affirmed
Opinion Opinion Without Without
Total In In Written Written
Term Cases Civil Criminal Civil Criminal Opinions Opinion Source
1949
Jan. 45 39 6 1 0 1 2.22 119 Colo.
Aor. 61 53 8 1 0 1 1.64 119, 120 Colo.
Sept. 48 42 6 6 0 6 12.50 120, 121 Colo.
1950
Jan. 46 40 6 6 0 6 13.04 121 Colo.
Apr. 66 61 5 10 1 11 16.67 121, 122 Colo.
Sept. 61 51 10 3 1 4 6.56 122, 123 Colo.
1951
Jan. 28 27 1 3 0 3 10.71 123 Colo.
Apr. 64 51 13 10 2 12 18.75 123, 124 Colo.
Sept. 58 48 10 9 0 9 15.52 124, 125 Colo.
1952
Jan. 48 42 6 7 1 8 16.67 125 Colo.
Apr. 59 51 8 6 2 8 13.56 125, 126 Colo.
Sept. 69 61 8 17 1 18 26.09 126, 127 Colo.
1953
Jan. 55 52 3 10 1 11 20.00 127 Colo.
Apr. 83 77 6 11 2 13 15.66 127 Colo.
Sept. 82 78 4 24 0 24 29.27 128 Colo.
1954
Jan. 64 54 10 17 0 17 26.56 128, 129 Colo.
Apr. 87 82 5 23 0 23 26.44 129, 130 Colo.
Sept. 76 67 9 21 2 23 30.26 130 Colo.
1955
Jan. 75 70 5 18 0 18 24.00 131 Colo.
Apr. 102 93 9 28 1 29 28.43 131, 132 Colo.





Jan. 58 ? ? ? ? 14 24.00 files of Colo.
Sup. Ct. Re-
porter
See graph following page
5 For analyses of a similar problem in the Supreme Court of the United States, that of denial
of certiorari, see Harper and Rosenthal, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term-
An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 293 (1951); Harper and Etherington, What the Supreme
Court Did Not Do During the 1950 Term, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 354 (1952).
Percentage of Decisions Without Written Opinions
from Jan., 1936-Jan., 1956
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